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INTRODUCTION

Impatient with the inaction of the state supreme court, the
South Carolina General Assembly took control of the matter of
products liability once again' in 1974 and enacted a statute
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We would like to express our appreciation to our colleague, Pat Hubbard, for his
review of and comments upon an early draft of this article.
1. Products liability had been addressed once before by the South Carolina legislature when it enacted Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1966. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 10.2 (Spec. Supp. 1966).
This article is limited to a consideration of the doctrine of strict liability in tort for
the sale of "defective" products as enacted into law by the South Carolina General Assembly in 1974. See note 2 infra. It should be observed that the adoption of the strict tort
statute was almost certainly not intended to restrict the use of Article 2 of the Code as a
source of products liability law. Instead, the legislature probably was simply attempting
to create an alternative, and in many respects parallel, source of products liability law.
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m (1965) [hereinafter cited as
§ 402A1. See also Dickerson, Was Prosser'sFolly Also Traynor's? Or Should the Judge's
Monument Be Moved to a FirmerSite?, 2 HOFSTA L. REV. 469 (1974); Wade, Is Section
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REV. 123 (1974). Nor, of course, was negligence law preempted by
the adoption of strict tort. See § 402A, comment a.
For articles examining the interrelationship of strict tort liability and warranty law
under the Uniform Commercial Code, see Dickerson, Was Prosser'sFolly Also Traynor's?
Or Should the Judge's Monument Be Moved to a Firmer Site?, 2 HoFSTRA L. REv. 469
(1974); Dickerson, The ABC's of ProductsLiability - With a Close Look at Section 402A
*
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adopting section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2 In

so doing, the legislature aligned South Carolina with the substantial and still-growing majority of jurisdictions imposing strict tort
liability upon sellers of "defective" products.3 In addition to clariand the Code, 36 TENN. L. REV. 439 (1969); Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability
Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966); Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887 (1967); Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity"
Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REV.
804 (1965); Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1970); Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement
of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?,42 TENN. L. REV. 123
(1974).
2. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 66-371 to -373 (Cum. Supp. 1976), which provides as
follows:
§ 66-371. Conditions under which seller liable. - (1) One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling spch a product,
and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) shall apply although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
§ 66-372. When recovery barred. - If the user or consumer discovers the
defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to
make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
§ 66-373. Intent of chapter. - Comments to § 402A of the liestatement
of Torts, Second, are incorporated herein by reference thereto as the legislative
intent of this chapter.
Section 66-371 is an adoption of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, with
only minor variations in language. Specifically, the word "thereby" appearing in § 402A(1)
between the words "harm" and "caused" does not appear in § 66-371(1) of the statute.
Secondly, § 66-371(2) states that the rule "shall apply" despite certain circumstances as
distinguished from the Restatement's use of the word "applies." See § 402A(2). Both of
these differences were in all probablility either inadvertent or merely an attempt to improve stylistically upon the language of § 402A, and consequently they should not be
accorded any substantive significance.
Section 66-372 is a verbatim recitation of the last sentence of comment n to § 402A
which recognizes the affirmative defense of assumption of risk in strict tort actions, limited by the requirement that such conduct be shown to have been unreasonable in order
to be effective as a bar to recovery.
Section 66-373 adopts the comments to § 402A as the "legislative intent" of the
statute, probably in an attempt to make it clear that the legislature was indeed adopting
§ 402A of the Restatement and also in an effort to add some meat to the bare bones of §
66-371. See note 26 and accompanying text infra.
3. For recent compilations by jurisdiction, see 2 L. FRUMER &M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCrS
LIABILrrv § 16A[3], at 3-248 n.2 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & FmEDMAN]; 1 R.
HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODucTs LIABILrrY § 4.41 (2d ed. 1974); Annot. 13
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fying the state of products liability law in South Carolina,4 the
enactment of this legislation naturally raises many questions as
well. 5 Indeed, the codification of strict tort by the legislature
A.L.R.3d 1057 § 4 (1967); CCH PROD. LIAB. REP.
4060. See also Arkansas' strict tort
liability statute, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.2 (Cum. Supp. 1975), and Georgia's limited
strict tort liability statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106 (1968). interpretedin Center Chem.
Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975). The most recent state supreme court
adoptions of the doctrine as this article is written are Hiigel v. General Motors Corp.,
Colo. -,
544 P.2d 983 (1975); Dietz v. Bryant Air-Conditioning Co., Kan. -,
P.2d - (1976).
4. For an exposition upon the confused state of products liability law in South Carolina prior to the enactment of the strict tort liability statute, see Torts, 1973 Survey of
S.C. Law, 26 S.C.L. REv. 336-44 (1974). For a brief description of the role of negligence
and warranty theories in the products liability law of South Carolina, see Gardner v.
Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971).
5. In addition to interpreting the core language of the statute - "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous"-the courts of South Carolina will also face the task of determining the proper interpretation to be given to the statutory words "product," "sell,"
"physical harm," and "ultimate user or consumer." Other courts have dealt extensively
with these issues, and a brief consideration of some major issues raised by each should
prove beneficial at this point.
"Product"-UsedProducts. The statute does not specifically address the issue of
whether a seller of a defective used product which injures a consumer should be held
strictly liable in tort. Nevertheless, it does speak in terms of "any" product which may
suggest that sales of used products should be included within the coverage of the statute.
Several cases have held that § 402A applies to the sale of used products. E.g., Rossignol
v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418 (1967); Peterson v.
Lou Backrodt Chevrolet Co., 17 Ill. App. 3d 690, 307 N.E.2d 729 (1974); Realmuto v.
Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974); Turner v. International Harvester
Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975); Bombardi v. Pochel's Appliance & TV Co.,
9 Wash. App. 797, 515 P.2d 540 (1973), modified on other grounds, 10 Wash. App. 243,
518 P.2d 202 (1974). See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R. 3d 337 (1973).
"Sell"--Non-Sales Transactions. While it is clear that the term "seller" in § 402A
includes every participant in the distributional chain from the manufacturer-and perhaps even the component part manufacturer-through the distributor and wholesaler to
the retail merchant (see § 402A, comment ), the terms "sell" and "sale" in the statute
give rise to the question of whether non-"sales" transactions come within the umbrella of
strict tort liability. There is considerable authority for extending the "sale" concept of
strict tort liability to certain transactions, such as leases, which are not "sales" transactions in the strict sense of the concept. See generally FRUMEI & FRIEDMAN §
16A[4][b][iii]. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212
A.2d 769 (1965), decided in warranty, is the seminal case. For other cases extending strict
liability to bailment and licensure transactions, in addition to leaseholds, see Bachner v.
Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alas. 1970); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85
Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 314 (1972); Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970); Whitfield
v. Cooper, 30 Conn. Sup. 47, 298 A.2d 50 (1972); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52
Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 121 (1973).
"PhysicalHarm"--Damages. A seller of a defective product is responsible under the
statute for any "physical harm thereby caused to the. . . consumer, or to his property."
The principal obligation imposed by the statute upon the product seller is clearly one of
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compensating for personal injuries or property losses occasioned by product "accidents."
Not so clear from either the statute or the comments to § 402A, however, is whether a
seller should also be liable for (1) damage to the product itself, or (2) "economic," "pecuniary," or "commercial" losses attributable to a failure of the product. As for damages
resulting to the product itself from an accident attributable to a defect in the product,
such as damages to an automobile which crashes due to a defect in its brakes, probably a
majority of courts today would permit recovery under the theory of strict liability in tort.
See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Hiigel
v. General Motors Corp., Colo. , 544 P.2d 983 (1975). See generally W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 665 (4th ed. 1971). But cf. Cooley v. Salopian Indus., Ltd., 383 F. Supp.
1114, 1119 (D.S.C. 1974). Where the product itself is simply received in a damaged condition, or where it deteriorates excessively over time, warranty law is most likely the buyer's
exclusive remedy, and an action in strict tort would not properly lie. See Cooley v. Salopian Indus., Ltd., supra. Some disagreement has developed over whether strict liability
in tort should embrace recovery for commercial or economic losses such as lost profits
attributable to the failure in the product. Some decisions have held that pecuniary losses
of this type are properly recoverable in a strict products action. E.g., Dennis v. Ford Motor
Co., 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973); cf. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207
A.2d 305 (1965). Another group has held that it is not. E.g., Seely v. White Motor Co.,
supra; Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
The reasoning of the Hawkins court is sound:
[Tihe doctrine of strict tort liability was not conceived as a substitute for
warranty liability in cases where the purchaser has only lost the benefit of his
bargain . . . . [lit was designed to make the risk of defect-caused injuries an
enterprise liability, so that the burden of injury is not placed entirely on "the
unfortunate victim" who is often ill-equipped to bear it . . . . If the loss is
merely economic, the Uniform Commercial Code has given the purchaser an
ample recourse. . . . Placed broadly, it is the law of sales, and not the law of
torts, which protects the buyer's interest in the benefit of his bargain.
Id. at 561-62, 209 N.W.2d at 653. See generally Franklin, When Worlds Collide:Liability
Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966); Speidel, ProductsLiability, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L. REv. 309 (1973); NOTE,
Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence,66 COLUM. L. REv. 917 (1966).
"Ultimate user or consumer"--Bystanders. Despite the apparent limitation of responsibility to "users" or consumers on the face of the statute, the draftsmen of § 402A
took an expressly neutral stance on whether responsibility should extend beyond the user
or consumer to the "innocent bystander" as well. § 402A, caveat (1) & comment o. The
American Law Institute adopted this neutral position because the cases at the time had
simply not gone beyond the user or consumer. § 402A, comment o. Today, however, in
harmony with the tort principles underlying the doctrine, the strict tort liability case law
has advanced in many jurisdictions to cover the foreseeable bystander injured by a defective product. See Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972); Sills
v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Lamendola v. Mizell, 115
N.J. Super. 514, 280 A.2d 241 (1971). See generally 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3,
at § 16A[4][c].
The case for extending responsibility to bystanders was compellingly advanced in
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652,
657 (1969):
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the consumer or user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably foreseeable. Consumers and users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect for defects
and to limit their purchases to articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputable retailers, whereas the bystander ordinarily has no such
opportunities . . . . [Ihf any distinction should be made between bystanders
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raises not only the usual difficult questions involving the nature
and scope of liability which arise from a judicial adoption of
section 402A but also raises some nice questions involving the
power of the judiciary to interpret the black letter rule in the
same manner or to the same extent as the judiciaries of those
states which have adopted the identical rule through the common
law process.'
By adopting the rule of strict tort liability, the South Carolina legislature has accepted the view that the responsibility of
sellers of products which cause harm to persons or property is best
determined by the principle of strict liability in tort. 7 While the
majority of courts and commentators agree on the appropriateness of the strict tort theory in this context, considerable differences of opinion exist concerning the proper conceptual basis for
the strict tort theory of liability,' the manner in which it differs
from negligence,' the appropriate roles of judge and jury in the
and users, it should be made ...
to extend greater liability in favor of the
bystanders.
The bystander issue is explicitly addressed in § 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. South Carolina Code § 10.2-318, addressing the question of horizontal privity,
adopts a slightly modified version of Alternative C of UCC § 2-318. It should be noted
however, that both the Official Comment and the South Carolina Reporter's Comments
to this section are addressed to Alternative A, the version studied and spoken to by the
South Carolina Reporter. Interview with Dean Robert W. Foster, South Carolina Reporter
for the Uniform Commercial Code, Feb. 22, 1976. Inconsistencies between the text of §
10.2-318 and its comments should of course be resolved in favor of the language on the
face of the statute, any other approach being destined to result at least in confusion, if
not in error. See McHugh v. Carlton, 369 F. Supp. 1271, 1274-75 (D.S.C. 1974).
6. One immediate decision which must be made is whether or not the statute should
be given retrospective effect. CompareCooley v. Salopian Indus., Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1114,
1118 (D.S.C. 1974) (South Carolina strict tort liability statute retrospective) with General
Motors Corp. v. Tate, 516 S.W.2d 602, 606-07 (Ark. 1974) (Arkansas strict tort liability
statute not retrospective).
7. See, e.g., Dickerson, ProductsLiability: How Good Does a ProductHave To Be?,
42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Dickerson]; Fischer, Products LiabilityThe Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. Rav. 339 (1974); P. Keeton, Manufacturer'sLiability:
The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYR. L. Rav.
559 (1969); P. Keeton, ProductsLiability-Some ObservationsAbout Allocation of Risks,
64 MICH. L. REV. 1329 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (StrictLiability to
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fallof the Citadel (StrictLiability
to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965); Vetri, Products
Liability: The Developing Frameworkfor Analysis, 54 ORE. L. REv. 293 (1975); Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Wade]; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers,19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
8. See notes 29-51 and accompanying text infra.
9. The difficulties experienced by the Oregon Supreme Court are instructive. In
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administration of the doctrine,'" and the proper role in strict tort
cases of the traditional affirmative defenses of negligence law."
This article will explore some of the basic issues of liability and
2
administration of the doctrine of strict products lia'bility in tort.'
II.

STRICT TORT LIABILITY THEORY

It is helpful to begin an analysis of strict tort liability by
establishing the doctrine's parameters. The most striking aspect
of the doctrine is that liability is imposed without regard to
whether the seller was in any way at fault or, conversely, whether
he exercised the greatest possible care.1 3 The doctrine of strict tort
Anderson v. Klix Chem. Co., 256 Ore. 199, 472 P.2d 806 (1970), the court concluded that
there was no difference between the negligence and strict tort theories of liability in the
context of inadequate warnings. This view was subsequently repudiated by implication
in Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974), and expressly so in Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 497-98, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974). In both cases the
court recognized the basic theoretical differences between the two theories of liability. The
similarities and differences between the two doctrines are developed extensively in section
III of this article infra.
10. See section IV A of this article infra.
11. See generally 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at § 16A[5][f]; Noel,
Defective Products:Abnormal Use, ContributoryNegligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25
VAND. L. REV. 93 (1972).
12. An excursion into the deeper recesses of tort law theory is beyond the scope of
this article. For a sampling of some of the more significant essays of this genre see A.
EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951), reprinted in 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1422
(1966); Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand
the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Calabresi, Optimal Deterrenceand Accidents,
84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liabilityin Torts,
81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Calabresi & Hirschoffl; Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 537 (1972); Henderson, JudicialReview of Manufacturers'Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973); Holford, The Limits of Strict
Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEx. L. REv. 81 (1973); R. Keeton,
ConditionalFault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. REV.401 (1959); Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 29 (1972); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection:Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974);
Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Product
Liability-DesignDefect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORN.L. REV. 495 (1976). See also
G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS. A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW (1969). Cf. J. O'CONNELL, ENDING

INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975).
13. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 66-371(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976). A caveat must be noted
here to the effect that due care is, in essence if not in doctrine, the underlying rationale
to the cases which exculpate sellers of "unavoidably" unsafe products. See notes 79-81 and
accompanying text infra.
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purports to direct attention away from the conduct of the seller,
at least according to traditional theory, and to focus it instead
upon the injury-producing product in its environment of use."
The need to substitute strict liability for due care as the appropriate standard of tort responsibility for manufacturers of defective
5
products springs from a variety of circumstances:'
(1) Manufacturers convey to the public a general sense of
product quality through the use of mass advertising and merchandising practices, causing consumers to rely for their protection upon the skill and expertise of the manufacturing community.
(2) Consumers no longer have the ability to protect themselves
adequately from defective products due to the vast number and
complexity of products which must be "consumed" in order to
function in modem society.
(3) Sellers are often in a better position than consumers to
identify the potential product risks, to determine the acceptable
levels of such risks, and to confine the risks within those levels.
(4) A majority of product accidents not caused by product
abuse are probably attributable to the negligent acts or omissions of manufacturers at some stage of the manufacturing or
marketing process, yet the difficulties of discovering and proving this negligience are often practicably insurmountable.
(5) Negligence liability is generally insufficient to induce manufacturers to market adequately safe products.
(6) Sellers almost invariably are in a better position than consumers to absorb or spread the costs of product accidents.
(7) The costs of injuries flowing from typical risks inherent in
products can fairly be put upon the enterprises marketing the
14. "Since the manufacturer's conduct is no longer on trial in strict liability, it follows
that the central issue in a products trial must be the product in the environment of its
use." Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, ProductLiability: An Interaction of Law
and Technology, 12 DUQUESNE L. REv. 425, 442 (1974). But cf. notes 141-147 and accompanying text infra.
15. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963) (Traynor, C.J.), was the seminal case imposing strict tort liability upon the
seller of a defective product. The American Law Institute adopted the principle in 1964
by its approval of § 402A. The evolution of the strict tort principle is chronicled elsewhere.
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YAm L.J.
1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REv. 791 (1966). For a recent delineation of the various policies underlying the theory
of strict tort liability, see Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont.
506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973). See also § 402A, comments b & c.

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

products as a cost of their doing business, thus assuring that
these enterprises will fully "pay their way" in the society from
which they derive their profits.
In combination, these reasons present a compelling case for basing the liability of product sellers on some foundation other than
fault. ,"On the other hand, even in combination these reasons by
no means compel a conclusion that product sellers should be
treated as insurers for all losses connected with their products.
17
And so the courts have unequivocally held.
Strict tort liability under section 402A reflects these principles. On the one hand, it is made clear that a seller will be subject
to liability although "the seller has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of his product.""8 This portion of section
402A emphasizes the "strict" nature of the liability imposed and
clearly distinguishes the liability theory from that of traditional
negligence law. On the other hand, liability is expressly limited
to products which are sold "in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer," 9 indicating that liability will
fall upon sellers for product-caused injuries only if something
went wrong with the product-only if it failed in some respect. °
These are the parameters of the doctrine.
Within these broad outlines the necessary first step in establishing liability in strict tort is to attribute the plaintiff's injury
to some "dangerous," "unsafe," or "hazardous" condition in the
product in question. The second step, and frequently the more
difficult one, is to demonstrate that the danger was excessive. In
every case the crucial question will be: Was the product duly safe,
or was it unduly hazardous? Especially in defective design cases,2'
16. See § 402A, comment c. Judge Traynor reached this conclusion at an early date
in E~cola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)(concurring opinion).
17. E.g., Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967); Elliott v.
Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 256 A.2d 153 (1969); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155
N.W.2d 55 (1967). "Strict liability has never meant that the party held strictly liable is
to be a general insurer for the victim no matter how or where the victim comes to grief."
Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 12, at 1056. For a critical examination of this proposition, its reasons and implications, see Holford, supra note 12.
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 66-371(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 66-371(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
20, See P. Keeton, Manufacturer'sLiability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYR. L. Rav. 559, 566 (1969); Wade, supra note 7, at
830.
21. In most cases involving injury-producing products containing physical flaws re-
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the question may be phrased slightly differently: How much danger is too much? How much safety is enough? As an aid to the
examination of this central issue in particular cases, courts and
commentators have identified three aspects of the manufacturing
and marketing process where excessive dangers are likely to arise.
These stages may be categorized as follows:
(1) Inadequate manufacture or assembly-the individual,
injury-producing product is excessively dangerous because it
contains a physical flaw occasioned by a failure in construction
or processing not screened out by the quality control process;2
(2) Inadequate design-the entire product line is excessively
dangerous within its foreseeable environment of use because of
an error in the selection, combination or omission of component
parts, or because of an error in the overall design concept; 2
(3) Inadequate warnings or instructions-the entire product
line is excessively dangerous because inadequate information is
conveyed to users concerning hazards in4 the product or concern2
ing the proper method for its safe use.

To determine whether too much danger has been built into
a particular injury-producing product at one of these three stages
of the manufacturing and marketing process, the strict tort principle calls for a determination of whether the product was sold "in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to the user or ansulting from a failure in the manufacturing process, the degree of danger or safety in the
product will not usually be at issue. Once a plaintiff is able to successfully attribute his
injury to a physical flaw in the product, the "undueness" of the danger generally should
not be subject to serious dispute. Although the "dueness" of the product's safety will often
be at issue in inadequate warnings cases, the facility of issuing adequate warnings renders
the determination of due safety of particular products relatively simple in many cases.
Most of the very difficult questions of how safe is safe enough arise in cases where the
plaintiff asserts that there was a defect in the product's design. Compare Bexiga v. Havir
Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972) with Rios v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works,
59 Ill. 2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232 (1974). Compare Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489
F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) with Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Volkwagen of America, Inc., 11
Wash. App. 800, 525 P.2d 286 (1974).
22. Eg., Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970);
Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971); General Electric Co. v.
Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972).
23. E.g., Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971); LaGorga v. Kroger
Co., 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967), affd, 407 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1969); Pike v. Hough,
2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
24. E.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); McCue v. Norwich Pharmical Co., 453 F.2d 1033 (1st Cir. 1972); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th
Cir. 1968); Tucson Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 501 P.2d 936 (1972).
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other. 5 In an attempt to add some meaning to this phrase the
legislature adopted the official comments to section 402A as the
"legislative intent" of the act.28 This was at once both expansive
and restrictive. It was expansive by making clear to the courts
that the legislature was indeed adopting section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, thus allowing the judiciary to
look freely to the judicial experience of the rest of the nation with
section 402A in interpreting the provisions of the act. On the
other hand, while some of the comments are helpful in understanding the nature of strict tort liability, others are not, for they
were drafted in the early 1960's against a backdrop of cases
largely involving defective foodstuffs.Y Moreover, these same
cases which provided the foundation for section 402A were decided in warranty and spoke the contracts parlance of the law of
sales.28 This contract law history to section 402A and its comments gives rise to some problems of moment, not the least of
which involves the very basis of the theory of liability.
The primary problem is that the black letter text and the
comments of section 402A suggest rather schizophrenically that
strict tort theory is founded both upon the contract law notion of
the frustration of the consumer's expectancy interest and upon
the tort law touchstone of reasonableness. This dual approach is
reinforced by the comments which define "defective condition"
29
as "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer"
and "unreasonably dangerous" as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer. ' 30 Thus the comments quite clearly predicate liability
25. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 66-371(1) (Cum.Supp. 1975).
26. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 66-373 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
27. See 38 ALl PROCEEDINGS 50-51 (1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A

(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961).
28. See 39 ALl PROCEEDINGS 236-40 (1962); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 800-01 (1966).
29. Comment q to § 402A provides in part:
The rule stated in this Section [402A] applies only where the product is, at the
time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.
30. Comment i to § 402A provides in part:
The rule stated in this Section [402A] applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. . . .The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.
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upon the notion of product disappointment or frustration of the
reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer - a concept
derived substantially from the law of contracts.31 However, although the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" is defined in terms
of the failure of a consumer's expectancy interest, the inquiry
must proceed further because of the clear tort flavor with which
the phrase is imbued.32 Nor can a contract law test of liability be
accepted unquestioningly in view of the fact that "[t]he basis of
'33
liability [under § 402A] is purely one of tort.
The phrase "unreasonably dangerous" was initially proposed
by Dean Prosser, the Reporter for the Restatement, in an early
draft of section 402A as the sole standard of liability, the thought
being that the phrase adequately suggested that something must
be wrong with the product before strict liability could be imposed. 4 However, in order to further emphasize the requirement
that the product fail in some respect before the seller could be
subjected to liability, the phrase "defective condition" was subsequently added, giving the core phrase in section 402A its present
form. 5 The tone of the comments indicates this same concern
that liability should not be imposed in the absence of a finding
that something indeed was wrong with the product.3 6 Thus, certain classes of products, such as those which are unavoidably
unsafe, are outside of the scope of liability.3 7 For example, the
very quality of a knife which renders it useful-its ability to
cut-is the very same property which renders it dangerous. Yet
31. See Wade, supra note 1, at 127. For a considered analysis of the expectancy
interest of consumers, see Dickerson, supra note 7.
32. The notion of unreasonableness has been of central importance in tort law for
more than a century. See Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertenceand Indifference; The Relation of Mental States to Negligence, 39 HARv. L. Ray. 849, 852 (1926) ("Negligence is
unreasonably dangerous conduct - i.e., conduct abnormally likely to cause harm. Freedom from negligence . . . does not require care, or any other mental phenomenon, but
requires only that one's conduct be reasonable safe.
...
(footnote omitted)); Terry,
Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REv. 40, at 40 (1915) ("Negligence is conduct which involves an
unreasonably great risk of causing damage.") Professor Terry proposed that the reasonableness of a given risk is a risk-benefit function of the magnitude of the risk, the value of
the object exposed to the risk, the utility of the risk-producer's conduct, and the necessity
for the risk.
33. § 402A, comment m. And of course the type of liability under consideration is
one of strict liability in tort. See 39 ALI PROCEEDINGS 236-40 (1962).
34. See 38 ALI PROCEEDINGS 55, 87-89 (1961).
35. Id.
36. See § 402A, comments i & k.
37. § 402A, comment k.
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technological and economic constraints preclude the manufacture of a knife which is both functional and completely safe.
Consequently, the seller of such products, assuming that they
have been properly manufactured and marketed, "and proper
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held
to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their
use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with
an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a
known but apparently reasonable risk.""
One reason why some types of unavoidably unsafe products
will not give rise to liability in strict tort is because the consumer
will often be aware of the risk and willingly accept it and thus
should not be unduly surprised when the product fails.39 However,
a sounder and more unifying basis of analysis for unavoidably
unsafe products, and one which is of general use for other products as well, is the familiar balancing of risks and benefits associated with the marketing of the product in a particular condition. This risk-benefit approach inheres in the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" and is the traditional basis for determining negligence liability so familiar to all torts lawyers."
A product then is "in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property" when the
risks of damage associated with its sale in a particular condition
outweigh the benefits to be derived from marketing the product
in such a condition. Refining and applying a risk-benefit analysis
to the products liability context, Professor Wade has suggested
that the determination of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous should be made upon a balancing of the following factors:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility
to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it
will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
38. Id.

39. Cf. Dickerson, supra note 7; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Tort Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965).
40. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Conway v.
O'Brien, Ill F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.9
(1956); Noel, Manufacturer'sNegligence of Design or Directionsfor Use of a Product, 71
YALE L.J. 816 (1962), reprintedin 42 TENN. L. REV. 11 (1974); Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv.
L, Rsv. 40 (1915); cf. Greiten v. LaDow, Wis. -,
235 N.W.2d 677 (1975). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 283, comment e, & 291-93 (1965). See note
32 supra.
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(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet
the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it
too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care
in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent
in the product and their avoidability, because of general public
knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the
existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance. 4

Building upon a solid risk-benefit nucleus of traditional negligence law theory, Professor Wade's factors have supplied the
courts with a fundamentally sound framework for deciding products liablility cases.4 2 Other commentators have offered other
approaches. Professor Fischer, for example, accepts most of the
concepts embraced in the Wade factors but splinters them into
15 separate considerations. 3 Professor Dickerson, on the other
41. Wade, supra, note 7, at 837-38. See also Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965).
42. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), afl'd 474 F.2d
1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Rios v. Niagra Mach. & Tool Works, 12 Ill. App. 3d 739, 299 N.E.2d
86 (1973); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972);
Coger v. Mackinaw Prod. Co., 48 Mich. 113, 210 N.W.2d 124 (1973); Finnegan v. Havir
Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore.
485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). See also Consumer Prod. Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81
(1970).
43. Professor Fischer outlines the relevant considerations in the following manner:
I. Risk Spreading
A. From the point of view of consumer.
1. Ability of consumer to bear loss.
2. Feasibility and effectiveness of self-protective measures.
a. Knowledge of risk.
b. Ability to control danger.
c. Feasibility of deciding against use of product.
B. From point of view of manufacturer.
1. Knowledge of risk.
2. Accuracy of prediction of losses.
3. Size of losses.
4. Availability of insurance.
5. Ability of manufacturer to self-insure.
6. Effect of increased prices on industry.
7. Public necessity for the product.
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hand, constructs a "legal defectiveness" framework principally
upon the vantage point of consumer expectations, recommending
five factors for use in liability determinations." Building on, but
far beyond, a consumer expectations base, Professor Shapo offers
a highly developed representational analysis with 13 relevant considerations.45 Others, such as Professors Page Keeton and Cala8. Deterrent effect on the development of new products.
II. Safety Incentive
A. Likelihood of future product improvement.
B. Existence of additional precautions that can presently be taken.
C. Availability of safer substitutes.
Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 359 (1974).
Professor Vetri offers a considerably more detailed outline of relevant considerations
spanning nine pages of the Oregon Law Review. See Vetri, ProductsLiability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 OaE. L. REv. 293, 305-14 (1975).
44. Professor Dickerson proposes that "a product is 'legally defective' if it meets the
following conditions:
(1) The product carries a significant physical risk to a definable class of consumer and the risk is ascertainable at least by the time of trial.
(2) The risk is one that the typical member of the class does not anticipate
and guard against.
(3) The risk threatens established consumer expectations with respect to a
contemplated use and manner of use of the product and a contemplated minimum level of performance.
(4) The seller has reason to know of the contemplated use and, possibly where
injurious side effects are involved, has reasonable access to knowledge of the
particular risk involved.
(5) The seller knowingly participates in creating the contemplated use, or in
otherwise generating the relevant consumer expectations, in the way attributed
to him by the consumer."
Dickerson, supra note 7, at 331.
45. Professor Shapo lists his factors as follows:
1. The nature of the product as a vehicle for creation of persuasive advertising
images, and the relationships of this factor to the ability of sellers to generate
product representations in mass media;
2. The specificity of representations and other communications related to the
product;
3. The intelligence and knowledge of consumers generally and of the disappointed consumer in particular;
4. The use of sales appeals based on specific consumer characteristics;
5. The consumer's actions during his encounter with the product, evaluated
in the context of his general knowledge and intelligence and of his actual knowledge about the product or that which reasonably could be ascribed to him;
6. The implications of the proposed decision for public health and safety generally, and especially for social programs that provide coverage for accidental
injury and personal disability;
7. The incentives that the proposed decision would provide to make the product safer;
8. The cost to the producer and other sellers of acquiring the relevant information about the crucial product characteristic and the cost of supplying it to
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bresi, propose unifying theories of defectiveness based upon a
single notion."
Much more than law professors, the courts have a very real
need for a decisional tool in strict tort cases to aid in liability
determinations. Fifteen factors or fifty may well be pertinent to
the liability determination in every products case, but fifteen
factors of varying degrees of importance are too many; a judge
attempting to use them all would likely become smothered in
factors. Yet single-factor tests suffer from problems of their own.
For example, Calabresi's test which asks "Who is best suited to
make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs? 4 7 may be attractive from a theoretical
perspective, but it probably strays too far from accepted doctrine
to be embraced soon by the many courts generally content with
the more traditional approaches. 8 Professor Wade's criteria, havpersons in the position of the disappointed party;
9. The availability of the relevant information about the crucial product characteristic to persons in the position of the disappointed party and the cost to
them of acquiring it;
10. The effects of the proposed decision on the availability of data that bear
on consumer choice of goods and services;
11. Generally, the likely effects on prices and quantities of goods sold;
12. The costs and benefits attendant to determination of the legal issues involved, either by private litigation or by collective social judgment;
13. The effects of the proposed decision on wealth distribution, both between
sellers and consumers and among sellers.
Shapo, A RepresentationalTheory of Consumer Protection:Doctrine,Function and Legal
Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1370-71 (1974).
46. Professor Keeton's test involves a determination of whether a reasonable manufacturer would market the product in a particular condition with full knowledge of the
harm which in fact is subsequently caused by the condition. See notes 141-45 and accompanying text infra. Professor Calabresi has stated his test succinctly as follows: "The
question for the court reduces to a search for the cheapest cost avoider." Calabresi &
Hirschoff, supra note 12, at 1060. See Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOmic ANALYSIS 135-40 (1970). See also notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text infra.
Of course neither Keeton nor Calabresi has suggested that a court's analysis should end
with the application of the particular single factor test without considering the subfactors
which underlie it. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 12, at 1060-61 n.20.
47. Calabresi, Optimal Deterrenceand Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 666 (1975). See
note 46 supra.
48. A flaw in the single, unifying factor approach is that the courts are apt to and
should demand a delineation of the subfactors which may be relevant to the liability
determination in particular cases. Single factor tests such as Calabresi's "cheapest cost
avoider" suffer from inflexibility and by their very nature are prone to mechanistic application and resulting erroneous decisions. And once a single factor scheme takes cognizance
of the problem and provides "veto room" in the system to accommodate such cases, the
unitary nature of the system is itself destroyed. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 12,
at 1080.
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ing served the courts quite well to date, can profitably be used
as a core for a refined framework designed in the light of the
judicial experience and academic explorations of recent years.
We propose the following factors as a guide to the determination of liability in strict tort cases involving the manufacture4 9
and sale of injury-producing products:
(1) The cost of injuries attributable to the condition of the
product about which the plaintiff complains-the pertinent accident costs.
(2) The incremental cost of marketing the product without the
offending condition-the manufacturer's safety cost.
(3) The loss of functional and psychological utility occasioned
by the elimination of the offending condition-the public's
safety cost.
(4) The respective abilities of the manufacturer and the consumer to (a) recognize the risks of the condition, (b) reduce such
risks, and (c) absorb or insure against such risks-the allocation
of risk awareness and control between the manufacturer and the
consumer.
The core of our decisional model, our first three factors, contemplates a balancing of the costs and benefits of marketing the
product with and without the offending condition. Our fourth
factor allows for some flexibility in the system where factors other
than costs and benefits may appropriately be considered in determining liability" as, for example, in certain cases involving products with unavoidable dangers, others involving product abuse by
the consumer, and those involving processing flaws reasonably
5
left in the product by the manufacturer. '
Professor Keeton's unitary factor does not of course suffer from the same type of
inflexibility since it is predicated upon the notion of reasonableness. The concept of
reasonableness, however, is divisible into various component parts that are capable of
individualized description and analysis in a manner productive of improved decisionmaking. This is the teaching of cost-benefit analysis and should be the starting point for
constructing a test of strict tort liability for judicial decision-making.
49. Our model is designed to cover only the manufacturer of a defective product, the
usual defendant in a products liability case. We do not address the basis of liability for
other "sellers," notwithstanding the fact that frequently similar considerations will affect
the liability determination in cases brought against such defendants.
50. Cf. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 12, at 1084.
51. For example, the application of a strict cost-benefit analysis to a serum hepatitis
case might result in a decision adverse to a plaintiff in an action against a blood bank
which supplied infected blood. A court, however, might wish to impose liability on the
blood bank despite the undiscoverability of the defect in order to stimulate research into
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In view of the absence of agreement on the proper conceptual
basis to strict tort liability theory, it is no wonder that there is
also confusion and disagreement surrounding the most appropriate language for use in jury instructions 2 to define liability. As
discussed above,53 the terms "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" are both defined in the comments in terms
of the contemplations of the consumer, suggesting that the terms
are essentially synonymous and perhaps even redundant. Indeed,
this view receives some support from the "legislative" history of
section 402A as it evolved during the early 1960's.11
methods of risk reduction-or simply as a means of spreading the loss. See Calabresi &
Hirschoff, supra note 12, at 1071. See generally Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis:An
Analysis and a Proposal,24 STAN. L. REV. 439 (1972).
An adult glue sniffer might be permitted to recover against the glue manufacturer
under a strict cost-benefit analysis if the loss of adhesiveness from eliminating an intoxicating and toxic chemical from the formula would be slight compared to the amount of
injury caused to adults sniffing the glue containing the toxic chemical. A court, nevertheless, might wish to deny liability in the first instance by a ruling of nondefectiveness due
to the control of the plaintiff over the risk environment, rather than relying upon the
affirmative defense of assumption of risk. See § 402A, comment h: "A product is not in a
defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption. If the injury
results from abnormal handling . . .from abnormal preparation for use, . . . or from
abnormal consumption, . . . the seller is not liable. See also § 402A, comment g.
Finally, since perfect quality control is often an impossibility, and the cost of manufacturers of improving the search for manufacturing flaws at some point becomes prohibitive, manufacturers of physically flawed, injury-producing products could sometimes establish that the benefits from improving quality control would be outweighed by the
increase in costs. A court might nonetheless desire to place the burden of such injuries
upon manufacturers in all cases because of the manufacturer's superior position to recognize the risk of such injuries and then to insure against or make plans to absorb the cost
of the resulting losses.
52. We propose that our four factors be used by trial and appellate courts as a guide
in decision-making but that juries not be specifically instructed on the factors. See Wade,
supra note 7, at 840-41. Instead, jury instructions should probably be kept at a more
general level in order to avoid confusion. See notes 118-49 and accompanying text infra.
The jury instruction we advance below, based upon the holding in Welch v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973), reflects the same basic principles which
underly our judicial decision-making model. Courts and juries should not, therefore, find
themselves working at cross-purposes. Some subfactors, however, such as a manufacturer's ability to insure against products liability losses, may be more properly examined
by the court alone. With this one caveat, counsel should generally be permitted to establish the reasonableness vel non of the product through proof and argument based upon
the individual factors.
53. See notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text supra.
54. See generally Wade, supranote 7, at 829-31. During the first floor debate of §402A
by the American Law Institute in 1961, Professor Dickerson moved to strike the phrase
"defective condition" and leave only the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" as the standard of liability, observing prophetically:
I am a little bothered by the phrase "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the consumer. . ." This signifies some nondefective conditions
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In part because of the dispute over the proper theoretical
foundation for strict tort liability, there has been no judicial consensus as to whether the entire phrase "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" should be used as the test of liability in particular cases or whether "defective condition" or "unreasonably
dangerous" used alone more clearly conveys the true meaning of
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer, and if there are, I would be interested
in hearing an example of a product which was at the same time unreasonably
dangerous but not defective.
I had always thought that "unreasonably dangerous" was simply the best
possible test for what was legally defective. It seems to me this idea is supported
fully in the analysis on Comment e on page 35, and it seems to me that everything we might want to cover here is subsumed under the words "unreasonably
dangerous."
Now, the addition of the words "defective condition"-it would seem to me
that this involves unnecessary questions of meaning. For example, in addition
to "unreasonably dangerous," what would a purchaser have to show in order to
make out a defective product? I would think that if he showed that it was
unreasonably dangerous, it would per se be legally defective, and it is only
gilding the lily to add the word "defective."
. . .Whenever we gild the lily, I think we just invite difficulty.
38 ALI PROCEEDINGS 87-88 (1961).
In response to Professor Dickerson's motion, Dean Prosser indicated that as the Reporter he had himself submitted § 402A to the Council in only the "unreasonably dangerous" form and that the additional phrase "defective condition" was thereafter added to
address the concern of the Council that sellers of products such as cigarettes, whiskey and
powerful drugs not be held responsible for harm resulting from excessive use. "Therefore,
they suggested that. . . something must be wrong with the product itself, and hence the
word 'defective' was put in .... " Id. By way of illustration, Dean Prosser remarked:
"'Defective' was put in to head off liability on the part of the seller of whiskey, on the
part of the man who consumes it and gets delirium tremens, even though the jury might
find that all whiskey is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer." Id. at 88. Professor
Joiner spoke in favor of Professor Dickerson's motion, and suggested that "the Reporter's
case of whiskey is taken care of by the words "unreasonably dangerous," adding that "We
merely confuse the law by adding 'defective.'" Id. at 89. With an appreciation of the
difficult problems of interpretation which the "defective condition" phrase was likely to
generate, Dean Lockhart also spoke in favor of striking the "defective condition" language,
revoking the support he had previously given to the addition of the language as a member
of the Council. He pointed specifically to the problems of applying a "defective condition"
standard, which connotes that the product must be physically flawed, to the developing
warning and design cases in which an unduly dangerous product is nevertheless marketed
"exactly the way the manufacturer intended," lamenting that such a defendant would be
"ina position to claim that it is not defective as long as it is made the way he intended it
to be made." Id. Upon a voice vote, which apparently was quite close, Professor Dickerson's motion to strike the "defective condition" language failed. Id. See note 129 infra. In
view of the very large number of warning and design cases which have arisen under § 402A,
and the very small number of cases involving the excessive use of whiskey, cigarettes and
drugs, it is indeed unfortunate that the predictions of needless confusion likely to result
from including the "defective condition" phrase were not heeded by the Institute.
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the liability theory and hence is the preferable working test of
liability. Some courts use the entire phrase from the
Restatement5 5 which, if confusing to lawyers and juries, at least
gives a court the solace of knowing that it is in the eminently
respectable company of the American Law Institute. Other courts
have eschewed this dual approach. The most noted case rejecting
the use of the complete phrase was the California Supreme
Court's decision in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen, Inc.," holding that the
proper standard of liability in strict tort cases is simply whether
the particular product was "defective." 5 7 The "unreasonably dangerous" language of the Restatement was rejected by the court on
the ground that it "burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of
an element which rings of negligence.""8 The court anticipated
that its return59 to the word "defective" as the sole criterion for
55. See, e.g., Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Corp., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970);
Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973);
Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1974).
56. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). The product involved in
Croninwas a hasp used to hold bakery trays in place in a delivery truck. The action was
brought by the injured driver against various defendants in the vehicle's chain of sale.
When the truck collided with another vehicle, the trays slid forward striking the hasp
which broke due to a structural flaw. The trays slid into the plaintiff's back hurling him
through the windshield and injuring him severely. At trial, the court instructed the jury
that the plaintiff should prevail if his injuries were attributable to a defect in the manufacture or design of the truck. The defendant contended unsuccessfully at trial and on appeal
that proof of the hasp's unreasonable danger, in addition to its defective condition, should
have been required.
A companion case, Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443 (1972), reaffirmed the holding of Croninthat proof of "defect" alone is required. The
Cronin decision has been followed in Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976
(D. Alas. 1973) (dictum), and Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562
(1973). For criticisms of the decision, see e.g., Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein. The
Technological Expert in Product Liability Litigation, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1303 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Donaher]; P. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect,
5 ST.MARY's L.J. 30, 30-32 (1973); Wade, supra note 7, at 839 (1973). For a more charitable
view see Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection:Doctrine, Function,
and Legal Liability for ProductDisappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1294-96 (1974).
57. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
58. Id.
59. In adopting the doctrine of strict liability in tort in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), Judge Traynor spoke
only in terms of defectiveness and did not even mention the notion of unreasonable
danger. "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being." Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. "To
establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was
injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a
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determining liability might lead to problems of interpretation,"
as indeed it has.'
Other courts have taken the opposite tack in fashioning a test
of liability, discarding the phrase "defective condition" in favor
of a standard based solely on a determination of whether the
product could properly be characterized as "unreasonably dangerous.""2 Of these three basic approaches, we believe that the
"unreasonably dangerous" standard is generally to be preferred. 3
Thus, at least in design and warning defect cases, the liability
defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use." Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. Seven
years later in Pike v. Hough, 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970), it looked
as if the California court had adopted § 402A and was placing its principal reliance upon
the notion of unreasonable danger. "The Restatement Second of Torts, section 402A
succinctly recites the standard of liability applicable to manufacturers.
...
Id. at 475,
467 P.2d at 236, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 636. "Whether the paydozer was unreasonably dangerous
due to faulty design when it left the hands of the manufacturer is clearly a question of
fact to be determined by the jury." Id. at 476, 467 P.2d at 237, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 637. The
subsequent decision in Cronin, then, amounted to a retreat from the Pike rule and a
reaffirmation of the rule as initially declared in Greenman.
60. 8 Cal. 3d at 134 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
61. See Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr.
110 (1973).
62. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Pyatt v.
Engel Equip., Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 309 N.E.2d 225 (1974). Rejecting the notion that
the "defective condition" phrase of § 402A adds any meaning to the concept of unreasonable danger, the court in Reyes made the following observations:
"[D]efective condition" has no meaning independent of "unreasonably dangerous"; the two terms are essentially synonymous. Thus if a product is unreasonably dangerous as marketed, the manufacturer may be held liable for injuries
proximately caused by what he has produced, whether or not it was manufactured exactly as intended, that is without a production "defect." We do not
understand this approach to dispense with the principle that to prompt liability
a product must reach the consuming public in a "defective condition." Rather,
by rephrasing the defectiveness requirement in terms of "unreasonable danger",
it becomes clear that the circumstances of marketing themselves can amount
to a defect; the defect can be extrinsic to the product.
498 F.2d at 1272-73.
63. One reason for the difficulty experienced by the courts and commentators alike
in deciding upon a single "best" test of strict products liability springs from the disparate
nature of the notion of defectiveness in the different contexts of manufacturing, warnings,
and design. And the policy reasons for imposing liability on a manufacturer vary with the
context. While the development of a single, ideal model of products liability for resolving
all cases is beyond the scope of this article, we believe that the unreasonably dangerous
standard is the best of the various models presently used by the courts in defining strict
tort liability under § 402A. Building on the judicial experience with § 402A to date, we
suggest below how a court might broaden the unreasonably dangerous standard to meaningfully cover most cases within the three different contexts of defectiveness. See notes
141-49 and accompanying text infra.
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determination can often best be made upon a consideration of
whether the injury-producing product was "unreasonably dangerous" as marketed in light of the four factors proposed above.
An advantage of the standard of unreasonable danger is that
it often focuses more precisely upon the critical question to be
determined in each case-the question of whether the risks attending the use of the product in the condition in which it was
marketed are acceptable to society in the light of the four factors
previously enumerated. 4 While in many cases the consumer expectations analysis produces a sound result, in others the test
works restrictively, producing results inconsistent with a sound
risk-benefit analysis of the problem. An expectancy analysis logically leaves little place for liability where the defect is open and
obvious,65 despite the fact that the obviousness of a danger is only
one of the several considerations which properly should bear on
the determination of liability.66 Nor does an expectancy standard
provide a sound basis of liability in cases where the person injured
by the product is other than the buyer or user.6" Moreover, an
attempt to determine the consumer's reasonable expectations of
safety concerning a technologically complex product may well be
an exercise in futility, 8 for the consumer may have at most only

a generalized expectancy - perhaps more accurately only an
unconscious hope-that the product will not harm him if he
treats it with a reasonable amount of care. Thus the determination of whether a particular product contains a minimally acceptable level of safety will often be rendered more satisfactorily upon
64. Cf. Donaher, supra note 56, at 1307:
The issue in every products case is whether the product qua product meets
society's standards of acceptability. The unreasonable danger question, then, is
posed in terms of whether, given the risks and benefits of and possible alternatives to the product, we as a society will live with it in its existing state or will
require an altered, less dangerous form. Stated succinctly, the question is
whether the product is a reasonable one given the reality of its use in contemporary society.
65. See P. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J.
30, 35 (1973).
66. Id. at 35 n.15; P. Keeton, ProductsLiability-Inadequacyof Information, 48 TEX.
L. REV. 398 (1970). The obviousness of a defect figures into our model in factor (4)(a). See
notes 109-15 and accompanying text infra.
67. See Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339
(1974). For example, the innocent bystander who is struck by a fragment of a defective
product may not even be aware of the product's existence before being hit and thus cannot
be said to have any expectation whatsoever about the product or the dangers it contains.
68. Cf. Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967).
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6n evaluation of the risks and benefits associated with the sale of
the product in the particular condition than upon a consideration
of consumer expectations about the proper level of safety for the
particular product. 9

The Cronin court was undoubtedly correct in observing that
the "unreasonably dangerous" phrase "rings of" and can be confused with the principles of negligence. Carefully administered,
however, the unreasonable danger test concentrates attention on
the safety of the product in the abstract and, at least to some
extent, shifts attention away from the issue of whether or not the
seller exercised due care, an issue declared to be irrelevant by
section 402A itself.7" Consequently, while the unreasonable danger standard can be confused with negligence, the risk of confusion can be controlled reasonably well. If a single standard of
liability is to be selected, the unreasonable danger standard thus
appears to be preferable as the basis for the theory of strict tort
liability.'
III.

STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE TORTS MILIEU

The thesis has been developed to this point that the form of
strict liability enunciated in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts is a tort law theory of liability which should be
analyzed primarily according to traditional tort concepts and terminology. The confusion between the.strict tort liability theory
predicated upon unreasonable danger with the negligence basis
of liability springs from the fundamental similarity underlying
both theories of liability which in turn accounts for the similarity
in the language used in the formulations of the separate tests of
liability.72 Both theories of liability are predicated in many in69. Manufacturing flaw cases, however, do not fit into the "unreasonable danger"
model particularly well. See note 21 supra. The fourth of our factors proposed above
establishes a basis for the holdings in these cases. See note 51 and accompanying text
supra.
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 66-371(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976). See note 13 and accompanying
text supra.
71. Refinements are added to the standard below, see notes 139-49 and accompanying
text infra, where it is proposed that the expectancy idea may play a constructive residual
role in defining the standard of liability.
72. Indeed, before the advent of strict liability in tort, courts and commentators often
spoke in terms of "unreasonable danger" as the standard to be applied in negligence cases:
"Liability is imposed only when an unreasonable danger is created. Whether or not this
has occurred should be determined by general negligence principles .

. . ."

Noel,
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stances upon the same basic type of risk-benefit analysis,73 a form
of analysis which pervades the law of torts and lies at the foundation of the theories of nuisance and abnormally dangerous activity liability as well. 7 4 This section will explore some of the similarities and differences between strict tort liability for defective
products, liability for abnormally dangerous activities, and negligence.
Despite the use in each of these separate tort doctrines of a
form of risk-benefit analysis for determining liability, the analysis
varies somewhat under each of the theories, reflecting the differences in the policies underlying these different types of tort liability. Consider, for example, the sale by a manufacturer to a contractor of a blasting cap containing adequate instructions and
warnings and which has been designed and manufactured as
safely as possible in light of existing technical, functional, and
economic constraints. Despite these precautions, assume that the
blasting cap is nevertheless triggered in some uncontrollable
manner, such as by a stray radio signal from a low-flying aircraft,
causing an explosion which injures persons and property in a
residential area where the mishap occurred. A damages action
against the manufacturer of the blasting cap predicated on strict
tort liability would be likely to fail since the product, as designed,
manufactured, and marketed probably could not properly be
characterized as unreasonably dangerous. However, an action
against the contractor predicated upon a theory of liability for
conducting an abnormally dangerous activity would have a strong
chance of success. The application of a similar, though not identical, risk-benefit analysis to both situations will generate opposite
results for the plaintiff in the two cases.
This result may be explained on the basis of the different
factors weighed in the risk-benefit calculus under the two theories
and the policy differences underlying each. The manufacturer of
the blasting cap in the above example would probably not be
liable under principles of strict tort liability because the cap was
properly manufactured and designed and contained adequate
Manufacturer'sNegligence of Design or Directionsfor Use of a Product,71 YALE L.J. 816,
818 (1962).
73. See, e.g., James, The Future of Negligence in Accident Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 911,
915-16 (1967); Wade, supra note 7, at 834-37, 841-42.
74. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974);
Wade, supra note 7, at 835.
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instructions and warnings. Since we have assumed that it would
be technically impossible to eliminate the risk of explosion from
all non-product sources, the manufacturer of this "unavoidably
unsafe" product was simply incapable of preventing the failure
of the product and thus would likely be exculpated from liability.
This result would be consistent with the principles of strict tort
liability since the manufacturer is not to be held as an insurer
against all losses caused by the product but rather is to be held
responsible only for damages attributable to some failure of the
product to perform with reasonable safety in its normal environment. 5
The fact that the danger in the blasting cap was unavoidable
sits on the other side of the scales in the case brought against the
contractor for engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity.
Under this theory of liability the inability to reduce or eliminate
the risk associated with the product weighs in favor of holding the
user of the product responsible for losses flowing from its use. 76
Liability is based upon the fact that the user, in order to accomplish his own ends, has injected into the community a far greater
danger than is fair, particularly in view of the non-reciprocal
nature of the risk.77 An important factor in deciding to classify an
activity as abnormally dangerous is that the actor is likely to
consume more resources from the persons in the area of the activity than is just in view of the relatively small utility which will
accrue to those particular persons from the activity. While persons in the area of the activity are thus allowed to recover their
losses because they have been exposed to an unfairly large
amount of risk compared to the benefits accruing to them, society
refuses to place an outright prohibition upon such activities because of the additional benefits flowing to the larger community
which result from permitting such activities to be conducted.
The different resolutions of liability in the two blasting cap
cases may also be explained on the basis of whether the particular
defendant had substantial control over the decision to expose the
citizens of the residential neighborhood to a particularly large risk
75. On the facts as stated, an injured plaintiff would be unable to propose a reasonable, alternative method of producing the product which would have prevented the injury.
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(c) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
77. Cf. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972);
James, Analysis of the Originand Development of the Negligence Actions, in THE ORIGIN
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION

35, 37 (Dept. of Transp. Mono. 1970).
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of harm. The manufacturer of the explosive device sold a product
which could be used either in a remote stone quarry or within a
densely populated neighborhood. When put to the former use, the
product's malfunction would be much less likely to cause serious
harm than would its malfunction in the latter environment. The
manufacturer will have little if any control over the environment
in which its explosive will be used. Consequently, the risk that
the product might damage a residential neighborhood is largely
"unavoidable" from his point of view. The" contractor, on the
other hand, is precisely the party who makes the decision to promote his own objectives at the expense of exposing the residential neighborhood to a substantial risk of harm. Since it is the
contractor and not the manufacturer who makes the "product"
ultra-hazardous-or unreasonably dangerous-by his decision to
use the explosive device in a residential neighborhood, it seems
appropriate to hold the contractor and not the manufacturer responsible for the injuries flowing from this decision. In a sense the
contractor in this case is an assembler of two raw materials or
components-the explosive and the neighborhood-and the
unreasonableness of the danger arises only because of his clearly
"avoidable" decision to combine these two ill-suited compo78
nents.
The different policies which underly strict tort liability for
selling defective products account for the different effect the unavoidability of a danger has on the determination of liability in
this area. While risk-spreading principles are shared tenets of
both doctrines, liability in strict tort for sellers of defective products arose in part because of a basic presumption that persons not
abusing products are not usually injured unless the manufacturer
has failed in some respect in designing, manufacturing, or marketing the product. Because of the coincidence of this presumption with the difficulty of discovery and proof of actual negligence
on the part of manufacturers, the strict tort theory was designed
in part to facilitate redress for consumers whose injuries are prob7
ably attributable to some negligence by the manufacturer. 1
Therefore, in cases of unavoidably dangerous products where the
manufacturer's care is clearly not in question, one of the central
78. To speak of a requirement that an abnormally dangerous activity contain a danger which cannot be eliminated is then, in this sense, imprecise.
79. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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policies lying behind strict tort theory would not be advanced by
the imposition of liability. Another policy underlying strict tort
liability generally not promoted in cases where the product is
proved to have been unavoidably unsafe is the policy of deterrence-of encouraging manufacturers to market safer products
because of the increased threat of liability for injuries caused by
dangers in the products. To the extent that the product is in fact
"unavoidably" dangerous, it cannot by definition be marketed in
a safer condition, and so to in'pose liability upon the manufacturer of such a product could not advance the deterrence objective of strict tort liability." For these reasons the unavoidability
of the danger has traditionally played a different role in the determination of liability within these two separate doctrines of strict
tort.'
Substantial similarities in analysis exist between strict tort
liability for the sale of defective products and negligence principles of liability." For example, a manufacturer may design an
automobile with the fuel tank placed at the very rear of the vehicle. This design will create a substantial risk of a gasoline-fed fire
in the event of a rear-end collision, a frequent type of accident.
In an action brought in negligence against such a manufacturer,
the design decision to locate the fuel tank at a point where it
would be particularly likely to be burst in a collision could easily
be characterized as unreasonable in light of the feasibility of safer
design alternatives. In the language of negligence law, the risk of
the foreseeable harm created by this design decision would very
probably outweigh any resulting benefits from the design. The
result would be the same if the action were brought in strict tort.
The location of the gas tank at the very rear of the automobile
increases the risk that persons will be seriously injured in the
event of a rear-end collision, and the risk can probably be substantially reduced by redesign without great expense or impairment of the utility of the product. Moreover, the operator of the
car, if he is aware of the danger at all, will have no real ability to
prevent other cars from colliding into the back of his own even if
he exercises the greatest of care. On balance, then, a product
80. However, where some hope of discovering a means to avoid the danger does exist,
the imposition of liability upon the manufacturer for injuries attributable to the danger
should encourage efforts to make such a discovery. See note 51 supra.
81. See text accompanying notes 75 & 76 supra.
82. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
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designed in such a manner could also quite easily be characterized as unreasonably dangerous.
The manufacturer in such a case should thus be liable
whether the question is framed in terms of whether his conduct
failed to match that of a reasonably prudent automobile manufacturer or, without regard to his conduct at all, whether the
product itself was simply too dangerous. But the fact that the
results are the same under the two theories of liability does not
mean that the methods used to reach the results are precisely the
same. A manufacturer would be negligent in designing an automobile in such a fashion because the benefits to be derived from
the dangerous design are outweighed by certain clearly foreseeable risks. From the perspective of strict tort theory, however, the
better view is that the balancing process includes not only risks
or costs which are foreseeable but all such costs which in fact
result.0 The manufacturer in a strict tort case is thus held to have
much more than reasonable foresight of the types and amount of
harm the product is likely to cause; he is held to have absolute
prevision of all harm the product actually causes in his evaluation
of the relative weights of the costs and benefits of his proposed
course of action.
Thus strict tort and negligence principles are apt to be very
similar in design cases, as will also be true in cases involving
inadequate warnings. But differences between the theories do
exist and must be comprehended. In addition to the difference in
the foresight required of sellers, another distinction of vital importance is the unavailability of the defense of contributory negligence in strict tort actions in most jurisdictions. 4 Moreover, costbenefit analysis is generally inappropriate for use in manufacturing defect cases where liability is almost absolute." It may therefore be of considerable importance to the plaintiff that the jury
not confuse the negligence and strict tort theories of liability, and
it is the responsibility of the trial judge to effectively minimize
the risk of confusion through careful administration of the two
doctrines.
83. See notes 141-45 and accompanying text infra.
84. See § 402A, comment n. The rule is to the contrary in a very few states. See, e.g.,
Hoelter v. Mohawak Service, Inc., 2 CCH PROD. LIAm. REP. T 7674 (Conn. Apr. 6, 1976);
Coding v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973). See generally
Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of
Risk, 25 VAND. L. Rav. 93 (1972).
85. See notes 21, 51 and 69 supra.
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ADMINISTRATION OF STRICT TORT LIABILITY LITIGATION

Functions of Judge and Jury

While strict tort liability is similar to the theory of liability
for abnormally dangerous activities in the sense that both reject
"fault" as a condition of liability, the administration of strict tort
liability litigation more closely resembles the administration of
negligence litigation. Whether a particular activity may be characterized as abnormally dangerous is generally considered to be
a fundamental policy decision for the court;86 once the judge has
so classified an activity, the jury's role is largely confined to determinations of causation, affirmative defenses, and damages. In
strict tort liability litigation, on the other hand, despite the potential magnitude of a decision declaring an entire product line
to be unreasonably dangerous, that determination may nevertheless be left to the jury in much the same manner that the reasonableness of an actor's conduct is ordinarily left to the jury in a
negligence case."
In a strict tort case the factors and policies involved in determining whether a particular product is unreasonably dangerous

are first used by the court in deciding whether a particular case
is properly submissible to the jury. Once the jury has received the
case, its function in a strict tort action is to determine whether
the product in fact was unreasonably dangerous as marketed,
similar to a negligence case where it would determine whether the
manufacturer had exercised reasonable care. Thus the issue of
unreasonable danger, like reasonable care, is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, whether it arises from a failure in design,
manufacture, or warning. Nevertheless, due to the ineluctable
tendency of questions of law, fact, and policy to merge together,
the law-fact distinction as a mechanism for allocating responsibilities between judge and jury is considerably easier to articulate
than it is to administer. Particularily during the earlier stages of
the development of strict tort theory when the notion of a "strict"
tort responsibility for product manufacturers was novel and still
somewhat heretical, many courts withheld the issue of a product's defectiveness from the jury for various reasons.
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, comment h (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1964).
87. E.g., Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974); Wade, supra note 7,
at 838-41.
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One such reason was a belief that the judicial system in
general, and the jury in particular, simply did not have the capability-given its limited resources and the limited nature of its
function of resolving particular disputes-to intelligently determine whether or not a product was indeed "too" dangerous. For
example, in one case involving a determination of the defectiveness of a truck wheel, the court held that the issue of whether the
'wheel was excessively dangerous could not be submitted to the
jury in view of its lack of expert knowledge concerning the cost
or feasibility factors involved in designing a safer wheel.8" Since
the jury had not been presented with any expert evidence on these
points, the court held that the jury lacked the competence to
determine whether the failure of the wheel had violated the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer.89
Because of the substantial impact on both the manufacturer
and society at large of a jury determination that a product's design is unduly dangerous, the argument has been forcefully advanced that juries should not be permitted to pass upon the adequacy of a product's design in cases where comparative guidelines, such as design safety standards promulgated by the industry or a legislature, are unavailable to assist the jury. Proponents
of this view contend that in such cases the jury will have no
standard against which to measure the safety or danger of the
product in question and thus will have no reasonable basis for
rendering an intelligent determination of whether the design of
the product is or is not unreasonably dangerous. The counterargument, of course, and probably the better view, is that the removal of large categories of design cases totally from judicial
scrutiny would relieve many manufacturers of any legal obligation whatsoever to design reasonably safe products and thereby
obviate an important incentive for the development and improvement of safety standards in industry as a whole.' Another related
88. Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore. 467, 474, 435 P.2d 806, 808-09 (1967).
89. Id. at 474, 435 P.2d at 809.
90. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973). But cf. Nader & Page,
Automobile Design and the JudicialProcess,55 CAUF. L. REv. 645 (1967).
91. There are presently many products for which no safety standards whatsoever have
been promulgated by any regulatory agency. Intrauterine devices were until very recently
a glaring case in point. See generally Hearingson Regulation of Medical Devices (Intrauterine ContraceptiveDevices) Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Note, The Intrauterine Device: A Criticism
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reason why courts sometimes withhold cases from jury determination, especially those involving allegations of defective design,
rests upon the political decision that the jury, although perhaps
capable of deciding whether the product is too dangerous, cannot
properly be given that power in cases involving fundamental policy decisions which could result in massive shifts of resources
within society." An examination of some of the recurring issues
will help to demonstrate these points.
1. The Technological and Economic Feasibility of Risk
Reduction.
Some cases raise the issue of the technological or functional
feasibility of altering the product in a manner that would reduce
or eliminate a particular risk of injury." Certain products, such
as knives, may be unavoidably unsafe because the elimination of
the risk of harm would also eliminate the function of the product,
of Governmental Complaisanceand An Analysis of Manufacturerand PhysicianLiability,
24 CLv. ST. L. REv. 247 (1975). On May 28, 1976, President Ford signed into law the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, which at last extends the
jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration to IUDs and other medical devices. Even
where a product's design is governed by safety regulations, those regulations may be
woefully inadequate. See The National Commission on Product Safety Final Report 94
(1970). The federal regulation of fabric flammability in previous years is one oft-cited
example of notoriously low safety standards adopted by a regulatory authority. See id.; 3
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at § 36.02[5][a]. See generally Krumholz, Technical
Aspects of Fabric Flammability, in P. RHEINGOLD & S. BIRNBAUM, PRODUCrS LIABILITY:
LAW, PRACTICE, SCIENCE 639, 653 (2d ed. 1975).
92. See text accompanying note 103 infra. Cf. James, The UntowardEffects of Cigarettes and Drugs:Some Reflections on EnterpriseLiability, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550, 155254 (1966).
93. Compare LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373, 379 (W.D. Pa. 1967) ("The
evidence showed that treatment of the cotton outer shells of jackets with flame retardant
would add to their costs only a few cents . ..,and their usefulness would not have been
impaired."), and McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 331, 154 N.W.2d 488, 495
(1967) ("This defect could have been eradicated by the adoption of any one of several
practical and inexpensive alternative designs . ....
"), with Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwork, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073-74 (4th Cir. 1974) ("This design [of a Volkswagen microbus] was uniquely developed in order to provide the owner with the maximum amount
of either cargo or passenger space in a vehicle inexpensively priced and of such dimensions
as to make possible easy maneuverability. . ...There was no evidence in the record that
there was any practical way of improving the 'crashability' of the vehicle that would have
been consistent with the peculiar purposes of its design."), and Garst v. General Motors
Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 21-22, 484 P.2d 47, 62 (1971) ("[The alternatives suggested by the
appellees' expert witness were neither available nor feasible . . . .General Motors . . .
is not required to expend exorbitant sums of money in research to devise a sophisticated
braking system which would price its product completely out of the market.").
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as discussed above.94 The serum hepatitis cases 95 present the related issue of the technological infeasibility of discovering the
product defect prior to the time it has actually caused some harm.
Whatever the ultimate merits of imposing liability on knife manufacturers or hospitals and blood banks for losses caused through
the use of their products, a valid argument may be made in both
situations that the question of who should most appropriately
bear the losses in these cases-where traditionally losses have
been borne by the victims as a risk of living-is simply too important for the jury to decide and is more properly one for the legislature. But where the feasibility of risk reduction is open to serious
question, the jury should be permitted to make the determination.
In other cases it may be clear to the judge that the strict tort
policy of encouraging the manufacture of safer products cannot
realistically be furthered without substantially or completely
eliminating the availability of a beneficial-if somewhat unsafeproduct, in view of the added expense or reduction in the product's usefulness which a liability decision would generate. This
would be a proper type of case for a judge to withhold from the
jury if indeed a reasonable jury could only conclude that the
addition of safety improvements would excessively increase the
product's price or impair its functionability. Stated otherwise, a
court should dismiss the case or direct a verdict for the manufacturer where the evidence clearly compels the conclusion that the
utility of safety improvements is plainly outweighed by their
disutility. If, on the other hand, a jury could reasonably conclude
that safety improvements to the product were feasible, the judge
should permit the jury to make that determination.
2.

Liability for the Second Collision.

A rapidly proliferating category of cases involves the "second
collision" or "crashworthiness" issue of whether a manufacturer
94. See text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra.
95. See, e.g., Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Ct. App.
1966), aff'd, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967); Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill.
2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank,
270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317
A.2d 392 (1974); Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (1974). See
generally Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis:An Analysis and a Proposal,24 STAN. L.
REV.

439 (1972).
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has an obligation to design its product in a manner reasonably
calculated to minimize injuries likely to result from foreseeable
misadventure. 6 The issue most frequently arises in the context of
automobile accident litigation, the plaintiff contending that the
manufacturer's obligation to market a reasonably safe vehicle
includes, for example, an obligation to provide adequate interior
padding, 7 a properly located gasoline tank," and passenger seats
designed with adequate safety." The issue simply stated is
whether a manufacturei will be required, in the first instance, to
anticipate the possibility that its products will be involved in
accidents from time to time and, in the second, whether it will
then be required to design the product to render it reasonably safe
for that environment.
The courts have divided on this issue. Some, following the
lead of Evans v. GeneralMotors Corp., '" have held that the automobile manufacturer does not have a duty to make its product
crashworthy since automobiles are intended to be used for driving
and not for crashing.' 0 ' These courts have employed this "intended use" doctrine as a justification for refusing to submit the
crashworthiness issue to the jury. The decision to keep such cases
from the jury may be based on several considerations. First, the
court may believe that the general policy of encouraging manu96. See generally Digges, The Impact of Liability for EnhancedInjury, 5 U. Balt. L.
Rev. 1 (1975); Hoenig & Goetz, A RationalApproach to "Crashworthy"Automobiles:The
Need for JudicialResponsibility, 6 Sw. U.L. Rev. 1 (1974); Roda, ProductsLiability-The
"Enhanced Injury Case" Revisited, 8 THE FORUM 643 (1973), reprinted in P. RHEINGOLD
& S. BIRNBAUM, PRODUCT LIABILITY: LAW, PRACTICE, SCIENCE 533 (2d ed. 1975); Note,
Aviation "Crashworthiness": An Extrapolation in Warranty, Strict Liability and
Negligence, 39 J. Am L. & CoMm. 415 (1973); Note, The Automobile Manufacturer's
Liability to Pedestriansfor Exterior Design: New Dimensions in "Crashworthiness",71
MicH. L. REV. 1654 (1973); Note, Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. GeneralMotors
and Its Aftermath, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 299 (1969); Note, Automobile ManufacturerLiable
for Defective Design That Enhanced Injury After Initial Accident, 24 VAND. L. REV. 862
(1971).
97. See Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969). Cf. Stempel v.
Chrysler Corp., 495 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1974); Burkhard v. Short, 28 Ohio App. 2d 141,
275 N.E.2d 632 (1971).
98. Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970).
99. Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1974); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v.
Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83
Wash. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974).
100. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
101. E.g., Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); Shumard
v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Walton v. Chrysler Corp.,
229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
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facturers to design safer products is outweighed in this particular
class of cases by the need to keep the cost of basic transportation,
a virtual necessity in modern society, as low as possible. Another
explanation for the Evans line of cases is a possible judicial
skepticism about the jury's ability to render an intelligent determination of optimal safety characteristics of such a highly complex piece of machinery as an automobile.' ° Finally, many of the
courts following the Evans intended use rule believe the imposition of burdensome safety obligations upon manufacturers is a
legislative and not a judicial function.' °3
A majority of cases, however, have followed the lead of
Larsen v. General Motors Corp.'04 in rejecting the Evans intended
use rationale.' 5 These cases have emphasized the irrelevancy of
the intended use notion in light of the statistical inevitability that
a sizeable percentage of all automobiles will become involved in
accidents subjecting the occupants to risks of serious injury.0 6
This is the growing and better view. The intended use doctrine's
limitation of the design obligation of reasonable safety to a point
short of the environment in which the product foreseeably will be
put to use is inconsistent with prevailing notions of the appropriate scope of responsibility for manufacturing enterprises. The
determination, therefore, of whether a given design may be unreasonably dangerous for failure to provide adequately for the
accident environment is one which the court should ordinarily
leave to the jury.
The logical weakness of the intended use doctrine does not
mean, however, that the issue of the reasonableness of the prod102. See notes 88-91 and accompanying text supra.
103. See note 92 and accompanying text supra. The competing considerations are
quite thoroughly examined in the two principal cases, Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), and Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.
1966).
104. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
105. See, e.g., Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1976); Turcotte v. Ford
Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d
1270 (8th Cir. 1972); Richman v. General Motors Corp., 437 F.2d 196 (lst Cir. 1971); Ford
Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166
S.E.2d 173 (1969); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973).
106. "Collisions with or without fault of the user are clearly foreseeable by the manufacturer and are statistically inevitable." Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495,
502 (8th Cir. 1968). The Larsen court was influenced by Professor O'Connell's finding that
"between one-fourth to two-thirds of all automobiles during their use at some time are
involved in an accident producing injury or death." 391 F.2d at 502, citing O'Connell,
Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. L. REv. 299, 348 (1963).
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uct's design should be submitted to the jury in every second collision case. The court must of course make a threshhold determination on the reasonableness of the design prior to submitting such
a case to the jury. In reaching this decision, the foreseeability of
product misadventure-if to be considered at all in a strict tort
case' 0 -is but one factor among several' 8° that the court must
consider in determining whether the jury may properly conclude
that the design of the particular product is unreasonably dangerous.
3.

Obvious Dangers and the Obligation to Provide Safety
Devices

A corollary issue to the second collision situation is raised in
the safety device cases. If a manufacturer has an obligation to
minimize injuries likely to occur once the product is involved in
an accident, does it have a corresponding obligation to provide
safety features which will prevent the accident from occurring in
the first place? As in the crashworthiness area, a substantial split
of opinion has arisen on this issue.'09 The one point on which there
is general agreement is that a manufacturer does have an obligation to provide a safety device-or a warning if a safety device is
not feasible or if the warning alone would sufficiently reduce the
risk-in situations where the dangerous condition in the product
is hidden or "latent.""" If, on the other hand, the danger is open
and obvious, a number of courts have held as a matter of law that
the seller has no obligation to provide a safety device or to warn."'
This rule has been vigorously criticized," 2 and rightly so, since the
107. See notes 141-45 and accompanying text infra.
108. See text accompanying notes 41 & 50 and notes 43-45 supra.
109. Compare Morrow v. Trailmobile, Inc., 12 Ariz. App. 578, 473 P.2d 780 (1970);
and Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), with Pike v. Frank G. Hough
Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Byrnes v. Economic Mach. Co.,
41 Mich. App. 192, 200 N.W.2d 104 (1972); and Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, 3 Wash. App.
508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970). See generally Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a
Right: Manufacturers'Liability for Patently DangerousProducts, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1065
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Marschall; Note, The Open and Obvious Dangerof a Design
Defect Does Not Necessarily Preclude Manufacturer's Liability, 49 TEx. L. REV. 591
(1971).
110. For a discussion of this point see Marschall, supra note 109, at 1077-84.
111. The seminal case is Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950). New
York finally overruled the Campo case in Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 384
N.Y.S.2d 115, 348 N.E.2d 571 (1976) (semble). Other cases are collected in Marschall,
supra note 109, at 1077-83.
112. See Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629
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mere fact that a dangerous condition was "patent" falls far short
of compelling a conclusion in every case that a particular product
was reasonably safe or even that the user fully appreciated the
3

risk.",

Whether a particular product is in fact unreasonably dangerous will depend not only upon the obviousness of the hazard and
the ability of the user to avoid the risk but also upon the ability
of the manufacturer to take reasonable steps to reduce or eliminate the dangerous condition." 4 An obviously dangerous condition in a product may be unreasonably dangerous because of the
tendency of users to occasionally drop their guard from boredom
or pressure in an assembly line environment, momentary diversions, forgetfulness, or simply careless-but predictable-inattention."t 5 If the risk of harm could have been substantially
(1970). See generally Marschall, supra note 109. In Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3
Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970), the court remarked as follows:
It seems to us that a rule which excludes the manufacturer from liability if the
defect in the design of his product is patent but applies the duty if such a defect
is latent is somewhat anomalous. The manufacturer of the obviously defective
product ought not to escape because the product was obviously a bad one. The
law, we think, ought to discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its
obvious form.
Id. at 517, 476 P.2d at 718-19 (footnotes omitted).
113. "[E]ven if the obviousness of the danger is conceded, the modern approach does
not preclude liability solely because a danger is obvious." Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2
Cal. 3d 465, 474, 467 P.2d 229, 235, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 635 (1970). See also Sargent v. Ross,
113 N.H. 388, 395, 308 A.2d 528, 532 (1973) ("The mere fact that a condition is open and
obvious. . . does not preclude it from being unreasonably dangerous. .. ."); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs 1493 (1956). See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
114. See Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1971), afl'd, 474 F.2d
1339 (3d Cir. 1973) ("[T]he obviousness of the danger must constitute but one of the
factors that determines whether the danger is unreasonable.").
One commentator states:
Any definite requirement that the defect or the danger must be latent seems to
revert to the concept that a.chattel must be "inherently" dangerous, and this
concept has been replaced under the modem decisions, by the rule that the
creation of any unreasonable danger is enough to establish negligence. Under
the modem rule, even though the absence of a particular safety precaution is
obvious, there ordinarily would be a question for the jury as to whether or not a
failure to install the device creates an unreasonable risk.
Noel, Manufacturer'sNegligence of Design orDirectionsfor Use of a Product,71 YALE L.J.
816, 838 (1962).
115. A peril or danger may be patent but still not appreciated. Moreover,
a manufacturer should incur responsibility for foreseeable injuries caused by the
dangers which were appreciated but momentarily forgotten, at least where it is
feasible to install a safety device to eliminate the danger. Such questions should
be decided by a jury, not by the court.
1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 7.02, at 118. For examples of excusable inadvertence
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reduced by a warning or by some form of safety device which
was both technologically and economically feasible, and which
would not have substantially impaired the utility of the product,
a jury should be permitted to determine that the absence of
such a device from the product rendered its design unreasonably dangerous despite the fact that the danger was open and
obvious.
4.

The Need for Flexibility

The important lesson to be learned from an analysis of the
cases in each of the three categories discussed above is that the
judicious administration of products liability litigation based on
the principles of strict tort liability requires first, a sound understanding of the policies underlying the theory of strict tort liability and, second, a considered application of the pertinent liability
factors to the facts of the individual case. A proper allocation of
responsibilities between judge and jury is much more likely to be
achieved on the basis of these considerations than upon a mechanical use of arbitrary and stale categorizations such as the
unavoidability of a defect, the intended use doctrine, or the
latent-patent danger distinction.
Rigid classification of tort law principles into narrow rules of
law reflects a nineteenth century fetish for imbuing the common
law with an artificial appearance of logic and certainty. Despite
an occasional and well-intentioned resurgence of effort in this
direction, the trend toward departmentalization in tort law was
halted long ago."' Courts in recent years have shown an increasby the user of an obviously dangerous product, see Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753
(E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Coger v. Mackinaw Prod. Co., 48
Mich. App. 113, 210 N.W.2d 124 (1973); Jennings v. Tamaker Corp., 42 Mich. App. 310,
201 N.W.2d 654 (1972); Byrnes v. Economic Mach. Co., 41 Mich. App. 192, 200 N.W.2d
104 (1972). A notion running through many of these cases is that the obviousness of the

danger is likely to be a good defense in and of itself only in the simplest of products. Even
with the most simple products, however, the better view is that a manufacturer may be
relieved of a duty to warn of the danger but should still be obliged to install practicable
safety devices which would substantially reduce the incidence of injury. This distinction
between simple and complex products is developed in Fanning v. LeMay, 38 Ill. 2d 209,
230 N.E.2d 182 (1967), and Fisher v. Johnson Milk Co., 383 Mich. 158, 174 N.W.2d 752
(1970).
116. Perhaps the classic turning point was Justice Cardozo's opinion in Pokora v.
Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934), which decisively rejected Justice Holmes' stop-looklisten-and-get-out rule promulgated in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66
(1927). See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTs § 35 (4th ed. 1971).
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ing recognition that many of the wooden categories of the common law, while providing facile tests for determining liability, are
ill-suited to the judicious resolution of major disputes arising out
of complex sets of competing values. Certainty and predictability
have clearly been sacrificed to some extent along the way, but the
benefits in flexibility and dynamism gained in the process have
led to an overall improvement in the administration of justice
under the broader principles of accident law. The obligation to
avoid exposing others to risks of harm which are unreasonable
under all of the circumstances, the central touchstone of the law
of torts, has been returned to with increasing frequency by courts
17
struggling with the inadequacies of more specific rules of law.
Courts should take cognizance of this general trend in addressing
the difficult issues in products liability law and accordingly
should avoid the temptation to overly "refine" the basic principles into particularized rules of law.
B.

Jury Instructions

The use of properly framed jury instructions is vital to the
proper administration of a strict tort liability case, both to outline
the general nature of strict tort concepts and to assist the jury in
avoiding confusion with the principles of negligence law."' When
a plaintiff makes claims in both negligence and strict tort, the
jury should be instructed that the determination of whether a
seller was negligent depends upon whether its conduct in designing, producing or marketing the product is proved to have been
unreasonable. Liability in strict tort should be distinguished as
depending upon a determination that the product itself was in an
unreasonably dangerous condition as sold, without regard to the
conduct of the seller. It is an unfortunate fact that this difference
between the two overlapping theories is largely obscured by the
similar use in both negligence and strict tort of the phrases of
117. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968) (specific rules of landowner and occupier replaced with single duty of due care to
all entrants); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973) (Kenison, C.J.) (specific
rules of landlord liability replaced with broad duty of due care). See generally, Love,
Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict
Liability, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 19 (1975).
118. The four factor judicial decision-making model is probably not an appropriate
form for a jury charge. See note 52 supra.
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"unreasonable risk of harm" and "unreasonable danger" in defining liability."'
Cognizant of this very real risk of confusion between the
standards of negligence and strict tort liability, some appellate
courts have disapproved jury instructions on strict tort liability
containing any intimation that the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct should be considered in the determination of liability. For example, in Eshback v. W.T. Grant's& Co.,'" a strict

tort case, the court held erroneous an instruction describing the
concept of foreseeability in terms of the "reasonable man." The
charge to the jury on foreseeability had stated: "An actor should
recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing an invasion
of another's interest if he possesses such knowledge . . . that a

reasonable man acting on such knowledge would infer that his
acts create an appreciable danger of causing injury to another."' 2 '
The court held that these instructions "improperly introduced
due care as a standard upon which the liability of the seller might
depend." '22 A similar concern was expressed by the court in Lunt
v. Brady Manufacturing Corp.,123 an action in strict tort against
the manufacturer of an agricultural machine. The appellate court
reversed a judgment for the defendant because the trial judge had
instructed the jury that "a machine is 'defective' and 'unreasonably dangerous' if it fails to 'guard against the dangers reasonably
to be foreseen.' "124 Holding the instruction to be prejudicially
erroneous, the court reasoned that it improperly focused upon
"the conduct of the seller rather than on the product and the
expectations of the consumer" and consequently had overtones of
the negligence law concept of due care.' 25 So long as the instructions have not confused the doctrines of negligence and strict tort
liability, however, most appellate courts have been surprisingly
tolerant of varying charges on the nature of strict liability in tort.
Thus some courts have approved the conservative approach of
reading the black letter of section 402A to the jury,' 26 while others
119. Indeed, the particular phrase "unreasonably dangerous" has been used for many
years to define negligence liability, see note 32 and accompanying text supra, and is
central to the definition of liability in § 402A. See note 2 supra.
120. 481 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1973).
121. Id, at 942 n.3.
122. Id. at 942.
123. 13 Ariz. App. 305, 475 P.2d 964 (1970).
124. Id. at 307, 475 P.2d at 966.
125. Id.
126. E.g., Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
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have approved instructions defining strict tort liability solely in
terms of "unreasonably dangerous' ' 2 7 or of "defective condi12
tion.,
The American Law Institute's formulation of liability in the
oblique phrase "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" reflects both the rather hasty atmosphere in which this language of
section 402A was debated and adopted 129 and the fact that initially the section was designed to cover only liability for the sale
of defective foodstuffs.' The Restatement phrase on its face
seems naturally to call for a bifurcated test of liability, requiring
the plaintiff to establish, first, the "defectiveness" of the product
and, second, that the "defect" rendered the product "unreasona127. E.g., Pyatt v. Engel Equip. Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 309 N.E.2d 225 (1974).
See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
128. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972); see notes 56-61 and accompanying text supra.
129. See 38 ALI PROCEEDINGS 87-89 (1961). The final vote of the American Law Institute in 1961 to retain the "defective condition" language in § 402A came after a very
minimal "debate" on this particular point, covering only three pages of the recorded
proceedings. Id. The debate that did transpire strongly favored striking the "defective
condition" language. Just as it was becoming clear that the inclusion of the phrase was
confusing and generally misguided, President Tweed called for a vote on Professor Dickerson's motion to strike the phrase because "[w]e have been two hours and twenty-two
minutes on this section," although the vast bulk of the discussion had been devoted to
other aspects of the section. The motion failed, and the language unhappily was retained.
38 ALI PROCEEDINGS 89 (1961). See note 54 supra.
This strange result can probably be explained by a combination of factors. The
offending language crept into § 402A early in its formulation prior to the extension of its
coverage beyond adulterated foodstuffs, within which context the additional language
apparently could do little harm. See note 130 infra. Moreover, the "defective condition"
language had the affirmative backing of the Council in addition to the neutral support of
Dean Prosser, the Reporter. See 38 ALI PROCEEDINGS 87-88 (1961). Although the section's
scope was broadened immeasurably with the extension of its coverage in 1961 to products
for intimate bodily use and then to all products in 1964, the language forming the basis
of liability was not reconsidered on the Institute floor again after the 1961 debate. By the
time the phrase "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" reached the full Institute
for consideration, it had naturally developed a considerable momentum which probably
only Dean Proesser had sufficient influence to stop. Yet as he stated at the time, "This is
perhaps the most spectacular development that I have witnesses [sic] in my lifetime in
the American law of torts," revealing his excitement with a development which he was
probably most anxious to memorialize in his second Restatement. 38 ALI PROCEEDINGS 52
(1961). See 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 349-51 (1964). From this union of academic excitement
and institutional inertia was born the critical language defining the basis of strict tort
liability and bearing a camel-like resemblance to the proverbial horse designed by a
committee.
130. See 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 349 (1964); 38 ALI PROCEEDINGS 50-71 (1961); Wade,
supra note 7, at 830.
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bly dangerous." Some courts' 3' and commentators 3 ' have in fact
interpreted section 402A to require this type of two step process
for establishing liability. Such a bifurcated approach to liability,
however, requiring a plaintiff to prove both "elements" of strict
tort, is unsound doctrinally and contradicts even the unified consumer expectations approach to liability expressed in the com'
ments to section 402A itself. 33
The Supreme Court of California, in the Cronin case discussed above,' 34 properly rejected the two step test of liability.
The occasion chosen for rejecting this bifurcated standard proved
to be unfortunate, however, since the case involved a defect in the
manufacturing process rather than an inadequate warning or
product design. Of the two phrases, the court myopically selected
the wrong one and approved a jury instruction defining liability
solely in terms of whether "there was a defect in the manufacture
or design of the equipment involved." '3 5
Other courts have chosen the opposite alternative, adopting
the "unreasonably dangerous" phrase and rejecting the language
"defective condition.""'3 One such decision was Ross v. Up-Right,
Inc. 31 in which Judge Wisdom sagely observed that "to speak in
terms of 'defect' only caus6s confusion. . . . The key . . . is
whether the product is 'unreasonably dangerous'.' 31 This is a
sound beginning for a jury instruction, but it is both too bare a
definition to be of much use to a jury and also too likely to be
confused with ordinary negligence.
131. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 420, 398 S.W.2d 240, 249
(1966); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 532, 452 P.2d 729, 736 (1969); Dippel
v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
132. See Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339,
342 (1974); Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2
HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 523 (1974).
133. See notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text supra.
134. See notes 56-61 and accompanying text supra.
135. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 128 n.5, 501 P.2d 1153, 1158 n.5, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 438 n.5 (1972).
See notes 55-67 and accompanying text supra. "Defect" was also the liability test chosen
by the Counsel of Europe's Committee of Experts in Article 3(1) of the 1975 Draft European Convention on Products Liability in Regard to Personal Injury and Death, defined
in Article 2(c) in terms of what "a person is entitled to expect." The Draft Convention is
set out in STAFF OF BUREAU OF DOMESTc COMMERCE, STUDY ON PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE-ASSESSMENT OF RELATED PROBLEMS AND ISSUES (March 1976) at 181 et seq. See
Lorenz, Some ComparativeAspects of the EuropeanUification of the Law of Products
Liability, 60 CORN. L. REV. 1005, 1014 (1975).
136. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
137. 402 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1968).
138. Id. at 947.
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Five years after he had decided Ross, Judge Wisdom had
another occasion to examine the nature of section 402A in Welch
3 9 in which he amplified the basis for
v. Outboard Marine Corp."
liability: "A product is defective and unreasonably dangerous
when a reasonable seller would not sell the product if he knew of
the risks involved or if the risks are greater than a reasonable
buyer would expect."' Three things are noteworthy about this
definition. The first is the tenacity of the word "defective" which
was yet to be scuttled five years after Judge Wisdom had himself
declared it to be only cause for confusion.
The second and more laudable aspect of the Welch definition
of strict tort liability is its use of the model of a reasonable seller
with full knowledge of the product's dangers."' Other courts have
also followed the suggestion of Professors Page Keeton and
Wade' and engrafted onto the unreasonable danger standard of
liability the perspective of a reasonable seller with total prescience of the frequency and magnitude of harm which in fact will
139. 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973).
140. Id. at 254.
141. The notion that an actor should be attributed with full knowledge of the results
of his actions in determining liability was proposed at an early date by Judge Andrews in
his celebrated dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928):
"I think the direct connection, the foresight of which the courts speak, assumes prevision
of the explosion, for the immediate results of which, at least, the chauffeur is responsible."
Id. at 355, 162 N.E. at 104-05. See Adler, Strict ProductsLiability: The Implied Warranty
of Safety, and Negligence with Hindsight, as Tests of Defect, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 581, 587
(1974).
142. The standard was apparently first proposed by Professor Keeton in the warranty
context in 1961. Keeton, ProductsLiability-CurrentDevelopments, 40 TEx. L. REV. 193,
210 (1961). Professor Wade suggested four years later that the standard be used to determine defectiveness within the context of strict liability in tort: "[A]ssuming that the
defendant had knowledge of the condition of the product, would he then have been acting
unreasonably in placing it on the market?" Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers,
19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965). See also Wade, supra note 7, at 839-40. Professor Keeton has
underscored the significance of the notion and developed it on various occasions. See
Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 38 (1973)
("It is unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude
of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the time of trialoutweighed
the benefits of the way the product was so designed and marketed." (emphasis in original)). See also Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacyof Information, 48 TEx. L. REV.
398, 407 (1970); Keeton, Manufacturer'sLiability: The Meaning of "Defect"in the Manufactureand Designof Products, 20 SYR. L. REv. 559-68 (1969); Keeton. Some Observations
About the Strict Liability of the Maker of PrescriptionDrugs: The Aftermath of MER29,
56 CALF. L. REV. 149, 158 (1968). It should be observed that Professor Wade's second factor
appears to be inconsistent with this notion since it speaks in terms of the "likelihood" that
the product will cause injury rather than in terms of the injuries which are in fact caused
by the product's condition. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
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result from marketing the product in a particular condition. 3 In
a sense this approach shifts the attention away from the product
and back to the seller once again, as in a negligence case, but it
imbues the seller with complete knowledge of the product's future
safety performance as it actually unfolds to the very date of trial.
Another court has articulated this refined version of the unreasonable danger standard in these words: "The proper test of 'unreasonable danger' is whether a reasonable manufacturer would
continue to market his product in the same condition as he sold
it to the plaintiff with knowledge of the potential dangerous consequences the trial just revealed."'' As thus refined, the unreasonable danger model transforms the somewhat subjective riskbenefit approach of negligence law-which is bounded by the
limits of reasonable foreseeability-into an objective evaluation
of the true costs and benefits of the product as marketed in its
particular condition.4 5 The reasonable-seller-with-full-knowledge
test gives an important additional perspective to the meaning of
"unreasonably dangerous" and should give the jury a sound and
workable frame of reference for determining liability in many
cases.
The final aspect of Judge Wisdom's delineation of the nature
of strict tort liability in Welch is novel and may prove to be the
ultimate solution to the search for a sound jury instruction. This
is the description of liability from the alternative perspectives of
either a reasonable seller with full knowledge of the product's
hazards or of a reasonable consumer with ordinary expectations.
Rather than splitting the test of liability into two requirements
that the plaintiff must separately establish, Welch can be read
143. See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1967); Dorsey
v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), afl'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court of Oregon has adopted this standard:
A dangerously defective article would be one which a reasonable person would
not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its harmful
character.The test, therefore, is whether the seller would be negligent if he sold
the article knowing of the risk involved. Strict liability imposes what amounts
to constructive knowledge of the condition of the product.
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) (emphasis
in original). The seller-with-full-knowledge standard is incorporated in the first factor in
our model.
144. Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), af'd, 474 F.2d
1339 (3d Cir. 1973) (emphasis in original).

145. The application of such a standard would help to achieve the enterprise liability
goal of insuring that manufacturers absorb all of the costs reasonably associated with the
marketing of their products. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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as articulating a dual test that provides relief for the plaintiff who
can establish a violation of either standard.'"
The Welch instruction has the doctrinal advantage of acknowledging the hybrid development of strict tort liability.'47 It
also has the practical advantage of supplying the jury with an
additional frame of reference for liability determinations based
upon the expectations of the reasonable consumer. While in a
specific case a jury, as a composite group of individual consumers, might have only a vague notion of whether a reasonable manufacturer would market a particular product having various costs
and utilities, they might have a strong basis for concluding that
the particular type of product accident would violate the expectations of a reasonable user.'48 Moreover, since the expectancy
model works particularly well in resolving cases involving manufacturing flaws, the combined approach of Welch provides a single definition of the standard of liability which should work well
in most types of products liability cases.'
V.

CONCLUSION

Strict tort liability is presently in the midst of its adolescence, struggling hard to find an identity of its own separate from
its tort and contract law parents. In order to maximally achieve
the objectives of the strict tort doctrine, any beginning point for
defining the standard of liability should include the core tort
146. Judge Wisdom expressed the belief that the two tests are essentially similar:
"We see no necessary inconsistency between a seller-oriented standard and a user-oriented
standard when, as here, each turns on foreseeable risks. They are two sides of the same
standard." 481 F.2d at 254.
147. Just as the principle of strict products liability has developed to provide relief
to consumers through both contract and tort, it would appear reasonable to allow the
Welch rationale to extend to cases where the independent application of each of the two
standards would generate inconsistent results, i.e., where the injured consumer could
establish a violation of one standard but not the other.
148. This would quite likely be the case in manufacturing flaw cases involving hidden
defects. See Fischer, ProductsLiability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 349
(1974). See also note 21 supra; cf. Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv.
1055, 1067 (1964).
149. A jury, given an instruction adopting this alternative means for recovery, should
be clearly charged that the plaintiff is entitled to a favorable finding on the liability issue
if he is able to demonstrate either that a reasonable seller with full knowledge of the
potential harm would not have marketed the product or that the product as marketed did
not comply with the ordinary expectations of the reasonable consumer. The risk that a
juror would mistakenly interpret such an instruction as requiring the plaintiff to establish
both bases of liability would thereby be minimized.
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notion of reasonableness. The reasonableness of the danger, determined upon a cost-benefit method of analysis, forms the nucleus of the four-factor model for liability determinations we have
proposed for judicial decision-making. By measuring the reasonableness of the danger from the perspective of a reasonable seller
with full knowledge of the product's actual potential for harm,
the unreasonable danger model of liability is refined to reflect
more accurately the underlying concept of enterprise responsibility. A further improvement to the definition of liability which
should facilitate jury determinations blends the seller and consumer tests of liability, allowing a plaintiff to prevail upon a
showing of a violation by the seller of either standard.
Juries given the double vantage point of a Welch instruction
upon which to consider the safety adequacy of particular products
should be in a firm position to render intelligent verdicts. And
courts applying the four-factor model to liability determinations
should have a flexible framework for deciding cases upon a sound
theory of strict products liability in tort.

